Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities by Chortareas, Georgios et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/94991/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Chortareas, Georgios, Logothetis, Vasileios and Papandreou, Andreas A. 2016. Political budget
cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities. European Journal of Political Economy
43 , pp. 1-13. 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.02.001 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.02.001
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.02.001>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects 
 in Greece’s Municipalities 
 
Georgios Chortareas* 
King’s College London and University of Athens 
Vassilis E. Logothetis** 
University of Athens 
and 
Andreas A. Papandreou*** 
University of Athens 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece’s municipalities. We 
construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral 
manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel 
data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our 
results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their 
political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are 
robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our 
investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies 
influence incumbents’ reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year 
opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of 
opportunistic public finances management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated 
budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts. 
Keywords: Political Budget Cycles, Reelection, Municipalities, Greece, Panel Data 
JEL Classification: D72, H7, C23 
 
*   (Corresponding author) Department of Management, King's College London, Franklin-
Wilkins Building, 150 Stamford Street, London SE19NH, UK. Tel +44 (0)20 7848 4164. Email 
georgios.chortareas@kcl.ac.uk. 
** Department of Economics, University of Athens, 105 59, Athens, Greece. Email: 
vlogothe@econ.uoa.gr 
*** Department of Economics, University of Athens, 105 59, Athens, Greece. Email: 
aap@econ.uoa.gr 
 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Greece’s economic and political environment is characterized, inter alia, by weak 
institutions, extensive opportunistic behavior by incumbents, substantial rent-seeking 
(Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2009), clientelism, and cronyism (Phelps, 2015). Such 
concerns may also afflict local government politics, which in Greece are closely 
associated with central government politics. This paper focuses on Greek municipal 
budgets and pre-electoral manipulation of public finances as one manifestation of such 
phenomena, considering the presence of politically induced opportunistic cycles in 
municipal fiscal policies. In addition, we examine how these electorally motivated 
budgetary policies affect mayors’ reelection prospects. We construct a new dataset from 
primary sources, which covers 109 municipalities from 1985 to 2004 and corresponds to 
half of Greece's population. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to identify Political 
Budget Cycles (PBCs) in Greece’s municipalities and to consider the expenditures' 
impact on mayors’ reelection prospects. 
Our focus on Greek municipalities provides some unique insights in Greece’s political 
economy. First, our newly collected data allows us to investigate the presence of PBCs at 
the municipal level in the context of an advanced economy albeit with a long history of 
political instability, weak institutions and high levels of political polarization. Second, 
studying Greece allows us to test if changes in the institutional framework, in this case 
the constraints implied by the country’s effort to join the Economic and Monetary Union, 
had any effect on the opportunistic policies at the municipal level. Third, our data allow 
us to study the impact of elections on the borrowing of municipalities, a budget element 
absent from other relevant studies. Although the magnitude of municipal borrowing is 
  
2 
very limited in the case of Greece, it is nevertheless indicative of incumbents’ 
opportunistic behavior. Fourth, given that local and national politics in Greece are closely 
related, we are able to systematically investigate how the interactions (alignment) 
between the different layers of government affect the size of the opportunistic cycle. 
Fifth, since no term limits apply for Greek mayors, we study the previously unexplored 
effects that a prolonged incumbency may have on the magnitude of municipal PBCs. 
Finally, as a key element of all reforms pertaining to local government in Greece over the 
last two decades has been the reduction in their number on the grounds of efficiency, we 
explicitly test whether small-sized municipalities are more conducive to the presence of 
PBCs or not.  
 Our evidence suggests that mayors in Greece manipulate fiscal policy prior to 
elections as the budget balance deteriorates during election years, while total 
expenditures, its highly visible investment component and municipal borrowing all 
increase. The electoral effects on investment expenditures appear more pronounced when 
the mayor is aligned to the central government ruling party or when he is running for 
another term, while no evidence exists that the magnitude of the PBC is affected by 
prolonged incumbency. Our analysis also shows that PBCs are present in the post-
Maastricht era and that their existence is robust to the exclusion of small-sized 
municipalities from our sample.  
We also examine how the electorally motivated budgetary policies affect mayors’ 
reelection prospects. Our evidence shows that both increased expenditures over the full 
term and election year opportunistic deviations have a positive effect on mayors’ 
reelection prospects. This finding is consistent with both the emergence of political 
budget cycles and the persistent mismanagement of local public finances. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
relevant literature for PBCs at the local government level and the effects of opportunistic 
policies on incumbents’ reelection possibilities. Section 3 provides some highlights on 
Greece’s local government institutions and political framework. Section 4 discusses our 
newly constructed dataset and estimation strategy for the detection of PBCs, while 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results of our analysis. Section 6 considers whether 
municipal expenditures affect incumbents’ reelection prospects. Finally, Section 7 
concludes.  
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2. Literature Survey 
2.1  Political Budget Cycles at the Local Government Level 
Political Budget Cycles emerge due to opportunistically motivated incumbents who try 
to enhance voters’ economic well-being before elections (Franzese and Jusko, 2006) as 
evidence suggests that economic conditions influence government support. This link, 
known as “economic voting”, has been studied with the help of voting and popularity 
functions (VP-functions) that explain government support (either in elections or polls) as 
a function of political and economic outcomes (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).1 
While recent research identifies several PBC determinants at the national level2, there 
is a growing literature considering political cycles at the local level where greater 
homogeneity in government structure, available policy instruments (Veiga and Veiga, 
2007a) and uniformity in electoral rules and dates (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011) are 
present. For instance, Blais and Nadeau (1992) show that in Canada provincial 
governments’ spending on social services and infrastructure construction increases during 
election years. Similarly, Galli and Rossi (2002) document the presence of election year 
increases in total expenditures and various spending categories like health care, education 
and road construction in Germany’s federal states. In the setting of a young, recently 
established democracy, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) report evidence of PBCs in 
Russia’s regional elections identifying electoral effects on public spending, financed by 
deficit and federal transfer increases. Along the same lines, Sjahrir et al. (2013) uncover 
evidence of opportunistic cycles in Indonesia’s districts with electoral effects being 
present in direct elections and of a larger magnitude when the incumbent runs for 
reelection. Evidence on the presence of politically induced cycles at subnational level 
finances are not solely confined to the post WWII period. Aidt and Mooney (2014) focus 
on London Boroughs for the early part of the 20th century documenting the presence of 
political budget cycles that are conditional on the suffrage regime either taxpayer or 
                                                          
1
 Kramer (1971), Fair (1978), Madsen (1980) and Lewis-Beck (1988) are among the first who provide 
evidence in support of the economic voting hypothesis. Nannestad and Paldam (1994) review early 
evidence and conclude that VP-functions can explain government support when voters hold the government 
responsible for the economic conditions. Evidence from recent studies are also consistent with the economic 
voting hypothesis. See for example Swank and Eisinga (1999), Feld and Kirchgässner (2000), Chappell and 
Veiga (2000) and Tucker (2001). For a review of recent evidence see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013). 
2
 For instance, Shi and Svensson (2006) focus on the level of economic development, Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) on constitutional features, Brender and Drazen (2005) on the age of democracy, Alt and Lassen 
(2006) on the transparency of fiscal institutions, Streb et al., (2009) on the effectiveness of checks and 
balances, while Rose (2006) on  fiscal rules. For a review of the literature see Drazen (2000), Franzese and 
Jusko (2006), and  De Haan and Klomp (2013).  
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universal. Under the former election year tax cuts are observed while under the latter 
capital spending increases during election years.   
A number of other papers study explicitly the emergence of PBCs at the level of 
municipal administrative entities. Veiga and Veiga (2007a) produce evidence of electoral 
effects in Portuguese municipalities. Their results show that elections have a negative 
effect on the budget balance through the decrease of local tax collection and the increase 
of municipal expenditures. Moreover, they show that before elections opportunistically 
motivated incumbents change the composition of expenditures towards highly visible by 
the electorate investment items, such as construction of overpasses and street works. 
Likewise, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) test for opportunistic and partisan cycles in 
Brazilian municipalities. In particular, their results show that elections have a positive 
impact on total and current expenditures and a negative impact on local tax revenues. 
They document a negative overall electoral effect on the local budget balance and, 
contrary to other studies, a similar effect on municipal investment. Foucault et al. (2008) 
report analogous electoral effects in France as all categories of public spending increase 
prior to elections. More recently, Drazen and Eslava (2010) consider Colombian 
municipalities, constructing a model of PBCs where incumbents manipulate the 
composition of expenditures to target specific segments of the electorate. They produce 
evidence showing that the most visible components of expenditures (e.g., road 
construction, power and water plants) expand before elections, while non visible 
components (e.g., interest payments) contract. With regard to the institutional conditions 
under which PBCs occur at the municipal level, Benito et al. (2013) focus on Spanish 
municipalities and study how the introduction of a balanced budget rule affects PBCs. 
They argue that in the presence of such a rule, electoral cycles still emerge but only after 
local governments have created the necessary fiscal room.  
 
2.2 Political Budget Cycles and Reelection Prospects 
If opportunistic/electoral concerns can affect budgetary policies at the local government 
level, a natural question arises as to how rewarding opportunism can be. A closely related 
to the PBC, but usually separate, strand of the literature focuses on whether higher pre-
electoral expenditures are beneficial for the incumbent or not. The evidence is somewhat 
mixed as results both in favor and against this hypothesis have been reported. Peltzman 
(1992), for instance, argues that US voters are averse to higher spending as they actually 
  
5 
penalize officials for increased spending before elections. Brender and Drazen (2008) 
study a large sample of countries and conclude that excess deficits do not boost 
incumbents’ reelection probabilities either in developed or developing countries and 
show that increased deficits during election years reduce the prospects for reelection in 
developed countries with established democratic institutions. At the local level, Brender's 
(2003) findings from studying Israeli’s local governments reaffirm the voters’ fiscal 
conservatism hypothesis, while the findings of Drazen and Eslava (2010) from 
Colombian municipalities similarly  show that high deficits affected negatively the share 
of votes received by the incumbent parties. Nevertheless, increases in the share of capital 
expenditures, perceived by the authors as targeted spending, positively affect the share of 
votes received.  
Other studies, however, that focus on local governments find that pre-electoral budget 
manipulation can be rewarding. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) document that 
increases in the size of fiscal cycles positively affects an incumbent’s probability of 
reelection in Russia’s regional elections. Likewise Veiga and Veiga (2007b), show that in 
Portuguese municipalities election year increases in investment expenditures are 
associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbents. For the case of Brazilian 
municipalities, Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) also show that increased public 
expenditures significantly influence mayors’ reelection prospects as increases in 
spending, both in election years and throughout the term, enhance mayors’ probability of 
remaining in office. More recently, Aidt et al. (2011) pursue an innovative approach to 
examine the joint determination of incumbents' win margin and the opportunistic 
distortion in Portuguese municipalities' finances prior to elections. They document that 
pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is larger when an incumbent is facing a tight race and 
provide evidence that increased expenditures during election years positively affect an 
incumbents’ win margin. Finally, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) focus on municipal 
elections in Spain and document, with the use of Bayesian techniques, that increases in 
public spending positively affect incumbents' probability of re-election. 
 
3. Greece’s Municipal Institutions and Political Framework 
Municipal elections in Greece were held every four years, during October, under 
universal adult suffrage with the timing of elections being exogenously fixed and a 
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uniform two round voting system applying to all municipalities. Registered voters decide 
over different electoral lists that candidate mayors put together and lead. The political 
parties strongly influence, if not directly determine, the selection of mayor candidates and 
their lists. They publically announce their support for a candidate and their lists and back 
them with financial contributions and mobilization of party members. The winning list 
elects both the mayor and the majority of the members in the municipal council. Mayors 
lead the administration, manage human resources, and oversee municipal operations, 
exerting strong influence both over the administration and the municipal council. Local 
politics in Greece to a large extent mirror national politics, which up until the 2012 
elections, have been dominated by two main parties, the right-wing “New Democracy” 
and the left-wing “PASOK” whose candidate mayors also prevailed in Greece’s local 
elections and were in effect provided by the electorate with “unchecked and unsupervised 
mandates” (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2012).   
Several attempts to improve administrative capacity and financial transparency at the 
local level have been made in the past. The 1997 and 2010 reform acts were among the 
most significant and their key feature was to introduce extensive mergers among 
municipalities, reducing their number in order to improve efficiency. The Reform Act 
2539/1997 reduced the number of local level administrative entities from thousands to 
910 municipalities and 124 smaller communes, while the latest 2010 reform act 
completely eliminated the smaller communes and further reduced the number of 
municipalities to 325. 
Municipalities in Greece operate under uniform fiscal rules and are mainly financed 
through the central government’s budget. Municipalities have the ability to impose 
compensatory taxation but revenues from this source are small when compared to those 
received via government’s budget. Similarly, borrowing is typically from government 
controlled financial institutions and constitutes only a small segment of total revenues. 
Nevertheless, municipalities in Greece draw up their budget every fiscal year on their 
own and decide freely on the allocation of their resources. Municipalities must fulfill a 
number of payments such as administrative expenditures and meet their debt repayment 
schedule. Moreover, various categories of expenditures that exceed a certain amount are 
subject to approval by the Court of Audit before the municipalities can disburse the 
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related funds.3 Besides the judiciary, the central administration supervises municipal 
finances and data are reported to the Hellenic Statistical Authority. Municipal accounts in 
Greece are released a considerable time after the end of each financial period and 
generally go unnoticed by the public.4 
 
 
  
4. Data and Estimation Strategy 
4.1   Data on Municipal Finances 
 
We construct and use a new dataset on Greek municipal finances. Our panel consists of 
109 municipalities, representing about half of Greece’s population (2001 Census). To 
ensure institutional homogeneity and continuity in our dataset, we focus only on those 
municipalities that have not been affected by the extensive municipal mergers introduced 
by the 1997 administrative reform. The time dimension of our panel ranges from 1985 to 
2004 and encompasses five municipal elections, held in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 
2002. Our data starts from 1985 when data are available for all municipalities. The time 
series length is constrained by changes in the financial reporting standards for Greek 
municipalities, which render the data after 2005 incompatible with earlier reporting. We 
obtain the annual data on Greece’s municipal finances from various publications of the 
Hellenic Statistical Authority (HSA).5  
Data on political variables are collected by the authors. In particular, we construct a 
dataset on mayors’ political affiliation relying on primary sources by considering the 
publicly announced party nominations prior to municipal elections as well as their 
systematic reporting in public media afterwards. The data on candidacies and mayors’ 
terms are retrieved from the national archive of electoral results at the Greek Ministry of 
Interior. The remaining variables used were obtained from the Hellenic Statistical 
Authority. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix I. 
 
                                                          
3
 In particular, after the 2010 administrative reform expenditures exceeding €100,000 are subject to 
obligatory legal inspection by the Court of Audit. If the expenditure fails to meet legal requirements it 
cannot be made. 
4
 This is not untypical. See Veiga and Veiga (2007a) for the case of Portugal. 
5
 We obtained some data in excel format (1999-2004) after request, while the 1985-1998 series were 
constructed by going through the “Municipalities and Communes Income–Expenditure” publications for 
each single year. These reports are publicly available but, at the time of writing this paper, only in Greek.  
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4.2 Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Method 
We use a typical model of PBCs (e.g., Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a; 
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011) specified as: 
                                  (1)    
where the dependent variable  denotes one of the j fiscal variables in municipality i at 
time t and is the lag of the dependent variable used to capture the fiscal variables’ 
persistence, is a vector of k control variables, and Electionsit is a dummy variable 
capturing the electoral effect, taking the value of one in election years and zero otherwise. 
The terms and represent the unobserved municipality specific effects and an i.i.d. 
error term, respectively.6 The fiscal policy variables include the Budget Balance, 
Borrowing Revenues, Total Expenditures, and, the highly visible to the electorate, 
Investment Expenditures. All variables are expressed in logarithms of Euros per capita 
(2005 prices), with the exception of the Budget Balance that can take negative values 
(e.g., Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2011). The vector includes a number of economic, 
demographic and political explanatory variables. The economic variables include 
revenues from central government in the form of direct transfers (GovSubsidies) and the 
amount of revenues collected from municipalities through special government-levied 
taxes (GovLeviedTaxes). To account for the effect of municipal population size we 
construct a variable (Population Category), following Veiga and Veiga (2007a), which 
assigns the value of 1 to the two largest cities, and 2, 3, and 4 to cities with a population 
over 40,000, 10,000-40,000, and less than 10,000, respectively. To control for the 
population’s age structure, following Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011), we include two 
demographic variables that represent the percentage of the population under 15 years old 
and over 65 years old (%Pop<15, %Pop>65). As mayors’ political ideology may 
influence fiscal decisions, we include an Ideology variable to account for possible 
partisan effects. We classify Greek mayors as left-wing or right-wing according to the 
party that publicly supports them and we attribute a certain partisan affiliation only when 
a mayor is elected under a party’s explicitly expressed support. The Ideology variable 
takes the value of -1 if the mayor of municipality i is supported by a left-wing party, the 
                                                          
6
 Since elections are synchronized across all municipalities in Greece we do not include time fixed effects 
because election year effects cannot be separated from aggregate shocks. Our approach on this issue is 
similar to Aidt and Mooney (2014). 
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value of 0 if the mayor is not supported by any party and the value of 1 if the mayor of 
municipality i is supported by a right-wing party. To capture the effect of prolonged 
incumbencies, we use the number of years that a mayor has been in office since 1982 
(Years as Mayor).7  
Equation (1) is a standard dynamic panel data specification. Nevertheless, the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable and municipality specific effects renders the OLS 
estimator biased and inconsistent. Although the Fixed-Effects (FE) estimator eliminates 
the unit specific effects, it cannot eliminate the bias introduced by the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables among the regressors. The order of the FE estimator bias is 1/T, 
where T corresponds to the time length of the panel. For small, even moderate T, the FE 
estimator is inconsistent but becomes consistent as T gets larger (Kiviet, 1995; Nickell, 
1981). Given that the time length of our panel is 20 years, the use of the Fixed Effects 
estimator in the context of a dynamic model may give rise to a non-negligible bias. To 
address this possibility, we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM 
estimator for dynamic panel data (see also, Shi and Svensson, 2006; Veiga and Veiga, 
2007a; Efthyvoulou, 2012). This estimator augments the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
difference GMM estimator using lagged differences of the dependent variables as 
instruments in the levels equations in addition to lagged levels of the dependent variables, 
which are used as instruments for the equations in first differences (see Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Baltagi, 2008). Since the estimated standard errors of the two step GMM 
estimator tend to be severely downward biased, we correct the bias using the Windmeijer 
(2005) finite sample correction (see Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009a). To avoid 
misleading results caused by instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set, as 
suggested by Roodman (2009b), to reduce the number of moment conditions. Finally, we 
perform the Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
of the differenced residuals and the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions.8 
 
5. Results and Discussion  
5.1 Baseline Evidence 
                                                          
7
 Incumbents in 1985 (the first year in our dataset) were elected in the 1982 municipal elections.  
8
 See also Table 1. 
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Table 1 presents our baseline results.9 The evidence shows that Elections have a negative 
and significant effect on the Budget Balance at the 5% significance level, while they 
positively affect Total Expenditures and its, highly visible to the electorate, subcategory 
of Investment Expenditures (both at the 10% level of significance). The latter includes 
infrastructure expenditures such as construction of roads, bridges and overpasses. This 
finding corroborates similar results documented in other relevant studies (see eg. Veiga 
and Veiga, 2007a; Drazen and Eslava, 2010). 
The existing literature on municipal finances and elections typically does not address 
how elections may affect local government borrowing10 whose pattern, as in the case of 
Greece, may be indicative of incumbents’ opportunistic behavior. The results reported in 
Table 1 reveal that the effect of elections on Borrowing is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The evidence suggests that in election years the budget 
balance decreases by 0.012 euros (in per capita terms, 2005 euros), while total 
expenditures rise by 3.1%, investment expenditures increase by 8.15% and borrowing 
increases by 120% with our findings corroborating similar electoral effects identified in 
studies on PBCs at the local level. The results also suggest that increased government 
transfers positively affect Investment Expenditures, while the population structure 
variables have a positive effect on Total Expenditures and its sub-component of 
Investment Expenditures in municipalities with a high percentage of young (under 15) 
population, reflecting the fact that extended parts of schooling provisions are a municipal 
responsibility, while expenditures pertaining to elderly population, such as social security 
schemes and healthcare, are primarily provided by the central government. In addition, 
the results in Table 1 indicate that the small size of municipalities has a positive effect on 
the Budget Balance and Investment Expenditures, while it negatively affects Borrowing. 
Results also show that partisan effects are absent in the case of Greek 
municipalities.11Finally, prolonged incumbencies do not seem to affect municipal 
                                                          
9
 For robustness purposes we have also considered a Fixed Effects estimator and the results are broadly 
consistent with those produced by the two-step system GMM estimator. 
10
 A part of the literature considers how constitutional restrictions may affect local public debt. For 
example, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) consider a cross section of 134 Swiss municipalities, while Cabasés 
et al. (2007) focus on Spanish municipalities. Letelier (2011) examines political determinants of municipal 
borrowing in Chile for the period 2004-2007. Geys (2007) considers opportunistic local debt cycles in 
Flemish municipalities with a focus on the implications of fractionalized government.   
11
 This result is similar to that of Veiga and Veiga (2007a) who provide evidence from Portuguese 
municipalities showing that partisan effects are solely confined to capital expenditures, which are higher 
under right-wing mayors.. 
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finances, as the number of years in office served by an incumbent does not enter the 
specification significantly for any of the dependent variables considered. 
The following section considers whether the magnitude of the opportunistic cycle 
depends on various factors that either enhance incumbents’ incentives for electioneering 
or impede their ability to pursue such policies. We focus on whether political cycles vary 
with mayors’ political alignment with the central government, their running for another 
term or not, and the number of years in office (prolonged incumbency). 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
5.2  Running for Another Term, Political Alignment and Prolonged Incumbency 
A mayor’s decision to run for another term or not may affect the presence and/or 
magnitude of political cycles. Rosenberg (1992) argues that incumbents who do not seek 
reelection generate larger political cycles as they try to secure gains for the post-election 
period. On the other hand, Veiga and Veiga (2007a) show that the presence of political 
cycles and their magnitude in Portuguese municipalities are not affected by whether a 
mayor opts for reelection or not. 
To test if a mayor’s decision to run for another term affects the magnitude of the 
electoral effect we allow Elections to interact with a dummy variable (ReCandidate), 
which takes the value of one when the mayors run for reelection and zero otherwise. 
Evidence presented in Table 2, Columns (1) - (4) show that the coefficient of the 
interaction term Elections*ReCandidate, is not statistically significant except in the case 
of Total Expenditures where evidence suggests (at the 10% significance level) that the 
magnitude of the political cycle is smaller when the incumbent runs for another term. 
Given that local politics in Greece are tightly linked to national politics we investigate 
how mayors’ political alignment with the ruling party12 affects the size of political cycles. 
As before we construct an interaction term, Elections*PolAlignment,13with results in 
Table 2, Columns (5)-(8) documenting that being politically aligned with the central 
government does not affect the magnitude of the electoral effects.  
                                                          
12
  Greece has been ruled by single party governments for the entire time period considered. 
13
 PolAlignment takes the value of one when both mayors and central government share party affiliation and 
zero otherwise. 
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While the results reported in Table 1 suggest that the years an incumbent has been 
in office do not affect municipal finances, a prolonged incumbency may be expected to 
affect the magnitude of the political budget cycle. An incumbent who has served for a 
prolonged period may have a greater ability to manipulate local finances, as he becomes 
more familiar with the relevant budgetary process or weaker incentives for pre-electoral 
manipulation. To test how prolonged incumbencies affect the magnitude of the electoral 
effects we include the Years as Mayor*Elections interaction term in our model. The 
results in Table 2 Columns (9)-(12), show that the number of years an incumbent has 
served in office does not affect the magnitude of the PBCs for any of the dependent 
variables used.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
Our findings suggest a profoundly opportunistic element in the management of 
Greece’s municipal finances. The question that arises naturally is whether this 
opportunism pays. Do increased expenditures during election years affect an incumbent’s 
probability of reelection, and if so, how?  
 
6. Fiscal Manipulation and Reelection Prospects 
 
6.1 Data and Estimation Method 
 
Having identified a robust opportunistic element in the finances of Greek municipalities, 
we examine the potency of such policies in terms of their effect on electoral outcomes. A 
positive response of the public to pre-election spending hikes reinforces the incumbents' 
incentives for manipulating the public finances. To investigate whether and how the 
management of public finances at the local government level affects incumbents’ 
reelection prospects in Greece, we consider data on election outcomes from the 
aforementioned 109 municipalities. The dataset ranges from 1985 to 2004, includes 5 
electoral years (i.e., 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002) and covers four full governing 
periods. Thus the dataset permits us to investigate how local finances affect reelection 
possibilities in four out of five elections included in our sample. We employ a fixed 
effects logit approach for the panel of Greek Municipalities used before, specified in 
Equation (2) as: 
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where F is the standard logistic distribution function, zit the dichotomous dependent 
variable (ReElection) taking the value of one if the mayor is re-elected and zero otherwise 
and ηi is the fixed individual specific effects. The set of explanatory variables includes the 
fiscal variables under the control of the mayor and political-institutional variables.   
We focus on the effects of two fiscal variables, namely Total Expenditures and 
Investment Expenditures over the full term as well as the effect of opportunistic increases 
that occur during election years. To investigate the latter, we follow the approach of 
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) and distinguish between average expenditures during 
the first three years of an incumbent’s term and the percentage deviation of election year 
expenditures from this average. With respect to other political-institutional variables, we 
employ in our analysis those used when studying the presence of PBC, and we focus on  
the Years as Mayor variable that captures the amount of time an individual has served as 
mayor. We expect that an incumbents’ popularity weakens over time and repeated terms.  
A panel data logit model constitutes a typical approach in investigating the 
determinants of reelection. A dilemma emerges, however, regarding the choice between 
an unconditional (standard logit MLE estimator) versus a conditional logit fixed effect 
estimator (Chamberlain’s MLE estimator). To decide we follow the suggestion of Baltagi 
(2008) and perform a Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis of homogeneity (no 
individual effects) both estimators are consistent but the conditional logit estimator is 
inefficient, as it may not use all available data. Under the alternative hypothesis the 
unconditional estimator is inefficient while the conditional is both consistent and efficient 
(Greene, 2002). The Hausman test in our case rejects the homogeneity restriction (that is, 
the homogeneity hypothesis) and suggests the inclusion of fixed effects. Using this 
procedure reduces the sample size since only municipalities where mayors have won and 
lost elections can be used in the estimation.14    
 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
 
We present the estimation results in Table 3. The baseline specification in Column 1 
shows that greater fiscal expansions during an incumbent’s term, as manifested by 
increases in Total Expenditures, affect positively the probability of reelection. Regarding 
                                                          
14
 This reduces our sample to 80 municipalities. 
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the other variables considered, the evidence suggests that increases in government levied 
taxes negatively affect incumbents’ reelection prospects, while higher levels of revenues 
from governmental direct transfers (GovSubsidies) affect them positively. The variables 
capturing the population structure do not affect the reelection prospects of incumbents. 
The amount of time that an incumbent has spent in office, however, strongly affects his 
reelection prospects. The corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that incumbents are subject to diminishing 
popularity over repeated terms and prolonged incumbency.15   
Column (2) reports the results from distinguishing between average expenditures in 
the first three years and the percentage deviation of election year expenditures from this 
average. The two coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This finding is comparable to evidence from  other studies (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 
2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b). The remaining control variables display results that are 
qualitatively similar to those in Column 1. 
The subcomponent of Investment Expenditures does not appear to have any significant 
effect. The relevant coefficient in Column (3) although positive is not statistically 
significant indicating that only increases in aggregate expenditures (Total Expenditures) 
appear to have a positive impact on incumbents’ reelection. The results in Column (4) 
suggest that this is also the case for average pre-electoral Investment Expenditures and 
election year deviations. This finding is interesting given that other related studies find 
that it is the visible expenditures that affect re-election the most (Aidt et al., 2011). We 
attribute this difference to Greece’s institutional features where for a long period of time 
some investments that are associated with local government activities were undertaken by 
local development corporations that draw on a different budget and operated under a non-
transparent environment.16The other coefficients are the same as before. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Our results, consistent with several other studies that provide evidence that pre-
electoral expenditures are electorally rewarded (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; 
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Veiga and Veiga, 2007b), document that in the case of 
                                                          
15
 For more on this erosion of public support while in office, most commonly termed as cost of ruling, see 
Paldam (1986), Paldam and Skott (1995) and Nannestad and Paldam (2000). 
16
 After the 2010 reform municipalities are allowed to operate only up to one municipal corporation. 
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Greece’s municipalities higher pre-electoral expenditures and election year opportunistic 
deviations are beneficial for incumbent’s reelection. This finding can partly explain the 
emergence of budget cycles and thus the prolonged mismanagement in Greece’s local 
finances.  
 
6.3  Further Evidence and Robustness Checks  
We first examine whether Greece’s effort to join the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) has restricted opportunistic politics at the local level,17 as this process may imply 
additional commitments and constitutional restrictions.18 We restrict our sample to the 
years after 1993 that cover Greece’s run up to joining the EMU and the first four years 
after its admission. the results are similar to those of the baseline model and we report 
them in Table A2, Columns (1)-(4).  
Since the extensive municipal mergers in Greece were introduced to tackle concerns 
over inefficiencies stemming from the small size of municipalities, we additionally test 
whether the presence of electoral effects is driven by the inclusion of small-sized 
municipalities in our sample. We remove municipalities with a population smaller than 
10.000 inhabitants,19 with results reported in Table A2, Columns (4)-(8), being similar to 
those presented in Table 1.  
 
<Table A2 about here> 
 
Turning now to the full dimension of our panel, we perform a series of additional 
robustness tests. First, as some of the policies may require substantial time to yield 
electoral results, we add a dummy variable to capture the effect of the year before 
elections. Results show that this dummy has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on Total Expenditures, Investment Expenditures, and Borrowing, while the effect of 
Elections remains qualitatively the same as in Table 1. Our results are robust to the 
                                                          
17
  For the effect of the Maastricht Treaty on economic voting see Veiga (2013). 
18
 With regard to specific restrictions, fiscal rules, imposed by national governments to local administrative 
entities Grembi et al. (2012) study how policy outcomes are affected by them focusing on municipal 
governments in Italy. Their evidence suggest that fiscal rules can reduce debt accumulation as their 
relaxation has a negative effect on the budget through a fall in tax revenues. 
19
 We exclude population category 4 municipalities as the average population after the last reform is 
approximately 30.000 citizens falling into population category 3.  
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inclusion of regional GDP per capita20 and regional level of unemployment in our model, 
suggesting that expenditures are procyclical as RegGDPperCapita positively affects Total 
Expenditures. When we replace the Years as Mayor variable with the number of 
consecutive terms that a mayor has served, results are qualitatively the same as in our 
baseline model. This is also the case when we substitute our Ideology variable with two 
separate dummies that capture when the mayor is of Left wing and Right wing political 
orientation. Finally, we replace our PopCat variable with municipal population. Results 
remain qualitatively the same as in our baseline specification. 21 
To test the robustness of our results on the effect of opportunistic policies on election 
outcomes we restrict our sample by excluding small sized municipalities (PopCat=4) and 
the 1990 municipal elections. The results presented in Table A3 remain qualitatively the 
same as in Table 3, indicating that opportunistic policies were electorally beneficial for 
Greek mayors in the post-Maastricht era.  
 
<Table A3 about here> 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We provide evidence of opportunistically motivated policies in Greek municipalities. We 
first consider the presence of PBCs in Greece’s municipalities, constructing a dataset 
from raw data that covers 20 years and half of the country’s population. The evidence 
produced shows an opportunistic PBC pattern in the budget balance, in total and 
investment expenditures, and in borrowing revenues. PBCs emerge in Greece’s 
municipalities regardless of whether the mayors run for reelection or not, or whether the 
incumbents are politically aligned with the central government or not. Moreover, 
prolonged incumbencies do not appear to affect municipal finances and the magnitude of 
PBCs. The evidence also shows that Greece’s effort to join the EMU had no effect on 
local opportunistic politics. The results are robust to the exclusion of small sized 
municipalities from our sample. This finding is interesting given that a key concern 
permeating all recent attempts to reform local governments in Greece was the merging of 
smaller into larger units.  
                                                          
20
 The regional GDP per capita is expressed in logarithms of Euros per capita (2005 prices). 
21
 Detailed results are available upon request. 
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We also consider if and how the management of local finances affects mayors’ 
reelection prospects. Our results show that increased expenditures over the full term as 
well as opportunistic deviations during election years are electorally rewarded as they 
have a positive impact on incumbents’ probabilities for reelection.  
Our findings provide insights on the management of local public finances in the run-
up to the Greek crisis, showing that prolonged mismanagement motivated by incumbents’ 
electoral concerns has been prevalent. This behaviour is characteristic of practices that 
contributed to Greece’s current economic predicament. Moreover, this opportunistic 
behavior at the sub-government level has been impervious to the various municipal 
reform attempts and the post-Maastricht implicit constraints, while being intertwined with 
central government politics.  
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TABLES 
Table 1:Political budget cycles (PBCs) in Greek municipalities: Baseline results. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis with finite-sample correction for the two step covariance matrix as 
developed by Windmeijer (2005). Instruments collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009b). ***,**,* denote 
significance at the 1,5, and 10-percent level. Hansen test for over-identifying restriction, where the null H0 
corresponds to valid over-identifying restriction. Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
first difference residuals, H0: No serial correlation. 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Budget 
Balance 
 
Total 
Expenditures 
 
Borrowing 
 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Elections -0.0120** 0.0309* 0.792** 0.0815* 
 (0.00528) (0.0174) (0.397) (0.0477) 
GovSubsidies  0.359 -0.0286 0.863*** 
 
 (0.279) (0.584) (0.312) 
GovLeviedTaxes  -0.0202 0.231 0.160* 
  0.359 -0.0286 0.863*** 
Ideology 0.00349 0.0120 0.0822 0.00949 
 (0.00305) (0.0172) (0.256) (0.0382) 
Population Category 0.00948*** -0.0461 -1.279*** 0.222** 
 (0.00338) (0.0722) (0.429) (0.110) 
Years as Mayor -0.000284 -0.000432 -0.0438 0.00368 
 (0.000609) (0.00186) (0.0558) (0.00584) 
% Pop<15 -0.0149 1.928* 10.97 9.983** 
 (0.120) (1.069) (17.93) (3.953) 
% Pop>65 0.0889 -1.297 -0.468 -1.073 
 (0.109) (1.167) (19.30) (2.935) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.781*** 0.968** 0.207*** 0.389** 
 (0.0605) (0.388) (0.0501) (0.189) 
Constant -0.0212 0.768** -6.224 -1.038 
 (0.0288) (0.375) (5.305) (1.232) 
     
AR(1) 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.116 0.222 0.130 0.899 
Hansen Test 0.389 0.871 0.374 0.317 
No of Instruments 10 13 13 13 
Observations 1511 1495 553 1493 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 
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Table 2: PBC's in Greek municipalities and the effects of mayors' running for reelection/mayors’ political alignment/prolonged incumbencies. 
VARIABLES (1) 
Budget 
Balance 
(2) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(3) 
Borrowing 
(4) 
Investment 
Expenditure
s 
(5) 
Budget 
Balance 
(6) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(7) 
Borrowing 
 
(8) 
Investment 
Expenditure
s 
(9) 
Budget 
Balance 
(10) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(11) 
Borrowing 
 
(12) 
Investment 
Expenditure
s 
Elections -0.0213*** 0.0774*** 1.016* 0.129* -0.0122** 0.0418* 1.225** 0.153* -0.0236*** 0.0640* 1.443* 0.177* 
 
(0.00704) (0.0265) (0.522) (0.0703) (0.00496) (0.0233) (0.593) (0.0893) (0.00896) (0.0366) (0.839) (0.105) 
Elections*Recandidate 0.0136 -0.0652* -0.344 -0.0715         
 (0.00975) (0.0355) (0.579) (0.0976)         
Recandidate -0.00759 0.0225 -0.409 0.0636         
 (0.00565) (0.0182) (0.317) (0.0606)         
Elections*PolAlignment     -0.00993 -0.0175 -0.961 -0.0365     
     (0.00815) (0.0316) (0.868) (0.104)     
PolAlignment     -0.00154 0.0364 0.783 0.00407     
     (0.00364) (0.0246) (0.482) (0.0532)     
Elections*Yeas as 
Mayor 
        0.000829 -0.00137 -0.0918 -0.00633 
         (0.00133) (0.00435) (0.121) (0.0113) 
GovSubsidies  0.387 -0.278 0.915***  0.639*** -0.0421 0.703***  0.797*** -0.0317 0.744*** 
  (0.281) (0.257) (0.320)  (0.243) (0.574) (0.185)  (0.220) (0.565) (0.214) 
GovLeviedTaxes  -0.0195 0.168 0.161  0.0605 0.231 0.0108  0.113*** 0.244 0.0243 
  (0.0524) (0.197) (0.0980)  0.639*** -0.0421 0.703***  (0.0322) (0.358) (0.0569) 
             
Ideology 0.00340 0.0128 0.0685 0.00934 0.00119 0.00123 0.0327* 0.163 0.00262 0.0267 0.0861 0.0333 
 (0.00307) (0.0171) (0.194) (0.0387) (0.00375) (0.00244) (0.0189) (0.277) (0.00257) (0.0214) (0.259) (0.0336) 
Population Category 0.00984*** -0.0480 -1.494*** 0.218* 0.00884 0.00832*** 0.0382 -1.277*** 0.00827*** 0.0777** -1.262*** 0.135* 
 (0.00344) (0.0720) (0.252) (0.112) (0.00548) (0.00310) (0.0668) (0.424) (0.00308) (0.0365) (0.432) (0.0710) 
Years as Mayor -0.000002 -0.000883 -0.0858** 0.00366 0.00110 0.00066 0.000269 -0.0436 -0.000007 -0.00438 -0.0215 0.00336 
 (0.000632) (0.00199) (0.0426) (0.00591) (0.000709) (0.000533) (0.00203) (0.0559) (0.000630) (0.00527) (0.0634) (0.00575) 
% Pop<15 0.00217 1.992* 7.610 10.27*** 0.187 -0.124 1.728 13.25 -0.119 0.762 10.89 8.199*** 
 (0.121) (1.066) (12.15) (3.956) (0.296) (0.112) (1.100) (17.86) (0.111) (1.903) (18.15) (3.168) 
% Pop>65 0.0658 -1.329 -2.770 -1.022 0.288 0.0978 -1.558 -0.202 0.0988 -1.050 0.0469 -2.828 
 (0.106) (1.176) (14.50) (3.079) (0.254) (0.0989) (0.990) (18.90) (0.101) (1.449) (19.37) (2.913) 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
0.779*** 0.957** 0.230*** 0.375** 0.822*** 0.525 0.207*** 0.499*** 0.821*** 0.223** 0.209*** 0.483*** 
 (0.0611) (0.390) (0.0277) (0.186) (0.0554) (0.334) (0.0502) (0.0518) (0.0551) (0.0885) (0.0497) (0.0520) 
Constant -0.0173 0.815** -4.908 -1.032 -0.00414 1.151*** -6.952 -1.360* -0.00451 1.434*** -6.374 -0.931 
 (0.0291) (0.379) (3.666) (1.253) (0.0268) (0.289) (5.254) (0.790) (0.0267) (0.423) (5.325) (0.834) 
AR(1) 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.116 0.234 0.133 0.905 0.116 0.223 0.148 0.934 0.118 0.256 0.135 0.955 
Hansen Test 0.395 0.853 0.316 0.350 0.422 0.807 0.379 0.371 0.423 0.868 0.371 0.373 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 11 14 14 14 
Observations 1478 1462 539 1460 1478 1462 539 1460 1478 1462 539 1460 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 109 109 88 109 109 109 88 109 
Notes:  See Table 1
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Table 3: Reelection 
 Full Sample 
DependentVariable: ReElection (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Expenditures (full mandate) 3.796**    
 
(1.878) 
   
Average preelection Total Expenditures  4.067**   
  
(1.984) 
  
Deviation from Average Total Expenditures (during election year)  0.0270**   
  
(0.0127) 
  
Investment Expenditures (full mandate)  
 
0.271 
 
  
 
(0.456) 
 
Average preelection Investment Expenditures  
  
0.244 
  
  
(0.454) 
Deviation from Average Investment Expenditures (during election year)  
  
0.00505 
  
  
(0.00338) 
GovSubsidies 1.496* 1.560* 1.595* 1.553* 
 
(0.899) (0.910) (0.861) (0.855) 
GovLeviedTaxes -0.555* -0.602** -0.599** -0.635** 
 
(0.303) (0.292) (0.296) (0.290) 
Population Category -2.146* -2.535** -1.907* -2.189* 
 
(1.136) (1.201) (1.140) (1.182) 
% Pop<15 -39.82 -38.53 30.70 -2.841 
 
(106.3) (107.3) (99.41) (107.5) 
% Pop>65 11.17 -6.036 6.850 -3.117 
 
(75.73) (81.99) (70.89) (74.26) 
Ideology 0.356 0.349 0.426 0.463 
 
(0.395) (0.407) (0.378) (0.381) 
Years as mayor -0.518*** -0.528*** -0.529*** -0.511*** 
 
(0.0938) (0.0952) (0.0907) (0.0894) 
Pseudo R2 0.5581 0.5729 0.5363 0.5477 
Hausman Test χ2= 26.97 χ2=27.08 χ2=30.02 χ2=29.60 
 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.00 
Observations 232 232 232 233 
No of Municipalities 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Coefficients from logit fixed-effects regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* denote  significance at the 1,5, 
and 10-percent level. 
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APPENDIX I  
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority. Dataset constructed by the authors. 
Notes:  Fiscal Variables are expressed in Euros per capita (2005 prices)  
 
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Per Capita Budget Balance 2079 0,019 0,304 -4,854 2,442 
Log of Per Capita Total Expenditures 2083 -1,176 0,584 -4,010 2,952 
Log of Per Capita Borrowing 1156 -4,665 1,848 -13,940 1,733 
Log of Per Capita Investment 
Expenditures 
2086 -2,902 0,981 -10,031 1,852 
Log of Per Capita GovSubsidies 2079 -2,557 0,624 -11,527 0,436 
Log of Per Capita GovLeviedTaxes 2072 -4,772 1,332 -10,846 1,348 
Log of Per Capita Region Level 
GDP 
1090 9,705 0,132 9,382 10,005 
Log of Region Level Unemployment 1635 2,330 0,232 0,888 2,847 
Percentage of the population under 
15 years old (% Pop<15) 
1526 16,335 1,931 13,476 22,040 
Percentage of the population over 65 
years old (% Pop>65) 
1526 14,121 1,923 10,603 22,452 
Population Category 2180 2.934 0,770 1 4 
Years as Mayor 2180   5,649 3,9521 1 22 
Elections 2180 0,25 0,433 0 1 
Ideology 2180 -0.379 0,820 -1 1 
PolAlignment 2074 0,495 0,50 0 1 
Recand 2180 0,205 0,404 0 1 
ReElection 436 0,527 0,499 0 1 
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Table A2: PBC's in Greek municipalities: Restricted Sample  
 
Restricted Time Span: 1994-2004 Municipalities with population < 10,000 excluded from the 
sample. 
 (1) 
Budget Balance 
(2) 
Total Expenditures 
 
(3) 
Borrowing 
 
(4) 
Investment 
Expenditures 
 
(5) 
Budget Balance 
 
(6) 
Total 
Expenditures 
 
(7) 
Borrowing 
 
(8) 
Investment 
Expenditures 
 
Elections -0.0129** 0.0376** 0.787** 0.0786* -0.0101** 0.624*** 0.878* 0.116** 
 (0.00540) (0.0178) (0.399) (0.0473) (0.00492) (0.238) (0.491) (0.0513) 
         
AR(1) 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.054 0.131 0.081 0.815 0.161 0.076 0.246 0.697 
Hansen Test 0.398 0.770 0.574 0.563 0.579 0.789 0.050 0.965 
No of Instruments 10 13 13 13 10 13 13 13 
         
Elections -0.0226*** 0.0874*** 1.653*** 0.151** -0.0128*** 0.0726** 0.355 0.170** 
 (0.00711) (0.0275) (0.555) (0.0698) (0.00453) (0.0284) (0.480) (0.0745) 
Elections*Recandidate 0.0142 -0.0697** -1.049 -0.110 0.00475 -0.0558 0.542 -0.0802 
 (0.0101) (0.0355) (0.665) (0.0934) (0.00828) (0.0396) (0.531) (0.102) 
Recandidate -0.00835 0.0290 0.0407 0.0922 -0.00650 0.0178 -0.703** 0.0563 
 (0.00649) (0.0212) (0.380) (0.0635) (0.00564) (0.0197) (0.328) (0.0653) 
AR(1) 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.047 0.005 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.054 0.141 0.103 0.759 0.161 0.076 0.297 0.690 
Hansen Test 0.401 0.776 0.572 0.552 0.585 0.757 0.431 0.981 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 
         
Elections -0.0128** 0.0448* 1.172** 0.113* -0.0131*** 0.0554** 1.447* 0.156* 
 (0.00524) (0.0234) (0.592) (0.0687) (0.00491) (0.0256) (0.807) (0.0832) 
Elections*PolAlignment -0.00982 -0.00681 -0.851 0.0199 -0.000649 -0.0164 -1.086 0.0127 
 (0.00815) (0.0339) (0.863) (0.0855) (0.00751) (0.0346) (1.086) (0.100) 
PolAlignment -0.00153 0.0255 0.703 0.0304 -0.000683 0.00299 0.615 -0.00615 
 (0.00539) (0.0210) (0.561) (0.0605) (0.00409) (0.0181) (0.571) (0.0623) 
AR(1) 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.115 0.216 0.093 0.825 0.110 0.093 0.277 0.695 
Hansen Test 0.430 0.621 0.685 0.579 0.388 0.764 0.099 0.952 
No of Instruments 12 15 15 15 12 15 15 15 
         
Observations 1199 1185 411 1180 1178 1176 491 1177 
No of Municipalities 109 109 88 109 90 90 77 90 
Notes: See Table 1. Control Variables used are the same as in Table 1 and are not reported to economize on space. Detailed results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Table A3: Reelection: Restricted Sample 
 Restricted Sample 
DependentVariable: ReElection (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Expenditures (full mandate) 6.107***    
 
(2.298)    
Average preelection Total Expenditures 
 
6.348***   
 
 
(2.367)   
Deviation from Average Total 
Expenditures (during election year)  
0.0267*   
 
 
(0.0137)   
Investment Expenditures (full mandate) 
 
 0.620 
 
 
 
 (0.568) 
 
Average preelection Investment 
Expenditures  
 
 
0.605 
 
 
 
 
(0.579) 
Deviation from Average Investment 
Expenditures (during election year)  
 
 
0.00440 
 
 
 
 
(0.00350) 
GovSubsidies 0.995 1.229 0.974 1.062 
 
(1.239) (1.248) (1.171) (1.141) 
GovLeviedTaxes -0.626* -0.679* -0.582* -0.622* 
 
(0.359) (0.361) (0.323) (0.324) 
Population Category -1.496 -1.454 -1.511 -1.734 
 
(1.817) (1.859) (1.697) (1.729) 
% Pop<15 137.2 140.5 103.7 69.37 
 
(151.1) (154.1) (142.0) (151.3) 
% Pop>65 29.92 17.76 33.42 25.60 
 
(93.45) (97.85) (83.75) (86.41) 
Ideology 0.0794 0.0939 0.334 0.404 
 
(0.458) (0.461) (0.432) (0.437) 
Years as mayor -0.478*** -0.477*** -0.472*** -0.457*** 
 
(0.0966) (0.0953) (0.0899) (0.0895) 
Pseudo R2 0.5551 0.5628 0.5079 0.5144 
Hausman Test χ2= 22.43 χ2=22.81 χ2=23.83 χ2=22.41 
 Prob=0.01 Prob=0.01 Prob=0.00 Prob=0.01 
Observations 194 194 195 195 
No of Municipalities 67 67 67 67 
Notes: See Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
